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The Constitution and Conflict-of-Laws Treaties:
Upgrading the International Comity
Ayelet Ben-Ezer* and Ariel L. Bendor**
Introduction
In the United States, like other federations, the Constitution's
relationship to the conflict-of-laws in the internal state context has
been debated intensively.' On the other hand, to date, little
attention has been paid to the constitutional conflicts arising from
international conflict-of-laws. More specifically, there has been
little discussion of the relationship between the Constitution and
treaties governing international conflict-of-laws. This absence is
striking since both international treaties and international conflict-
of-laws have been discussed extensively over the last few years.2
The growing importance of international treaties and international
conflict-of-laws is the result of globalization and the penetration of
constitutional discourse into private law. Their role in legal
discourse and foreign policy is expected to continue expanding.
Generally cautious regarding international agreements, the United
States has only entered into a few conflict-of-laws treaties.3
Nonetheless, the aforementioned trends suggest that it will
consider joining further treaties. This essay will offer some
preliminary insights into the relationship between international
conflict-of-laws treaties and the Constitution.
Assistant Professor of Law, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya.
Dean, Faculty of Law, Haifa University.
I See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 222 (3rd ed. 2000)
[hereinafter SCOLES ET AL].
2 See id.
3 See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6638; Hague
Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Co mmercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444; Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for
Foreign Public Documents, Oct. 5, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 10072; Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1545 (1980).
The United States is also a party to a line of relevant bilateral treaties. See SCOLES ET
AL., supra note 1, at 2.
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Conflict-of-laws treaties are agreements between the United
States and other countries dealing with one of the three areas
relating to conflict-of-laws.4 The first is international jurisdiction
over private disputes. In addition to the factual connection to the
United States, private disputes affect other countries, regardless of
whether or not those countries are partners to treaties.5 The second
area is the international conflict-of-laws in the narrow sense,6
namely the determination of the law applicable to a private dispute
factually linked to a number of countries.7 The third area is the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.8 It concerns
the readiness of the courts and enforcement authorities of a
particular country to recognize judgments of other countries as res
judicata or to enforce such judgments.9
The interaction between conflict-of-laws treaties and American
constitutionalism gives rise to two main problems of apparent
constitutional dissonance, which will be the focus of this
discussion. The first problem is institutional, and the second
substantive.
The first problem, on the institutional level, is the non-
correlation between the conferral of constitutional powers
regarding the conclusion of international treaties and the conferral
of constitutional powers governing the regulation of private law.
The consensual view is that, constitutionally speaking, the
conclusion of treaties is a federal prerogative,10 whereas most
realms of private law are regulated by competent state
authorities." Furthermore, the conclusion of treaties is primarily
4 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
5 Id.
6 Generally speaking, in England the term "Private International Law" refers to the
entire realm, dealing with the three main subjects, one of which is "Choice of Laws" (or
"Conflict-of-Laws"). In the United States, on the other hand, the expression "Conflict-
of-Laws" describes both the entire realm, as well as one of its significant sub-topics -
conflict-of-laws in the narrow sense. See DAVID MCCLEAN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 2-4
(5th ed. 2000); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-3; A.V. DICEY & J.H.C. MoRIs, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 32 (Adrian Briggs et al. eds., 13th ed. 2000).
7 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-3.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1146.
10 For different approaches, see Edward Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State
Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000).
II See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 374-76 (1976).
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an executive constitutional prerogative, while establishment of
private law is a legislative function (and in areas governed by the
common law - a judicial role). On the substantive level, there is
potential for conflict between existing or future international U.S.
commitments under conflict-of-laws treaties and other
constitutional rules.
At both levels, a central role is played by the consideration of
"international comity."' 2 Though generally important in the realm
of conflict-of-laws, 3 in our view, this consideration becomes
seminally important when international treaties, which express
explicit legal commitments between the United States and its
contracting partners, produce comity. The conclusion of a treaty
accommodates the optimal expression of comity. Thus, in an
international treaty, comity has an upgraded function.
This essay is divided into two parts. In Part I, we describe the
main constitutional rules regarding the power to conclude
international treaties, including private law, of which conflict-of-
laws is a part. We will discuss the constitutional non-correlation,
facially at least, between some of these rules, and attempt to
illuminate it from the perspective of the upgraded consideration of
international comity. In Part II, we will discuss the potential
discord in the field of conflict-of-laws between the treaty-based
commitments of the United States and the parallel commitment to
substantive constitutional rules. We will offer a few suggestions
for dealing with these inconsistencies, based on the upgraded role
of the international comity consideration in the rubric of
international conflict-of-laws rules established in the treaties. Our
discussion of the first problem will be essentially illuminative - an
attempt to provide a justifying, though not necessarily historic,
rationale for the accepted arrangement. Our discussion of the
second problem will be essentially normative, indicating
appropriate parameters for a solution.
I. Institutional Non-Correlation: A Suggested Illumination
A. International Conflict-of-Laws and the Constitution
Like other fields of law, international conflict-of-laws is
12 See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 89, 98 (1999).
13 Id.
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subject to the Constitution. 4 First, the Constitution is the supreme
source of power to establish rules governing the international
conflict-of-laws. 5 Second, the rules of international conflict-of-
laws must substantively cohere with the Constitution. 6
Concededly, the Constitution does not contain any provisions
dealing explicitly with international conflict-of-laws, but there are
numerous empowering and restrictive constitutional provisions
that are applicable to the field.'7
Essentially, international conflict-of-laws is a branch of private
law, and as such constitutional provisions which regulate the
power to determine private law rules are equally applicable to the
power to determine rules for international conflict-of-laws.18
Individual states are generally empowered to regulate private
law.' 9 This power includes the authority to establish rules for
international conflict-of-laws, whether by legislation or in state
common law.2"
Douglas Laycock2 adopts a slightly different approach.
Laycock writes: "How U.S. courts treat foreign law is a matter of
comity and diplomacy, the voluntary choice of a sovereign power.
[However], [h]ow Texas courts treat the law of a sister state is a
matter of law, not comity, and the choice is no longer voluntary."22
In our opinion, this position is overly broad. International
conflict-of-laws rules focus primarily upon the regulation of the
legal rights of human persons and not of countries.2 3 Admittedly,
importance attaches to considerations of foreign relations and
international reciprocity, just as the rules of interstate conflict-of-






20 Although in the vast majority of the states no dispute exists regarding the validity
of the common law, there is a certain uncertainty regarding the source of the Court's
power to create law. See James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549-
50 (1991); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 359-61 (1974).
21 Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992).
22 Id. at 259.
23 See MCCLEAN, supra note 6.
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laws impute importance to these considerations, albeit to a
different degree.24 Nonetheless, the claim that substantively
speaking it belongs in totum to the realm of foreign relations and
diplomacy would be more appropriate with respect to public
international law, which deals with relationships between nations,
and not the conflict-of-laws in private disputes (private
international law).25  But notwithstanding their focus upon
individual disputes, certain treaty-based arrangements in
international conflict-of-laws rules establish legal rights for
countries and not only for individuals. These arrangements are
illuminated by the special status they confer to international
comity. In the normative sense, there is room for special attention
to be accorded to considerations of international comity in the
application of the international conflict-of-laws rules established in
treaties .26
B. Apparent Institutional Non-Correlation
The international conflict-of-laws rules, especially in their
narrow sense, are products of state law. In this sense, they
resemble other branches of private law in the United States.27 An
exception to state hegemony over these rules is their determination
by the federal authorities, namely the President and the Senate,
within the framework of international treaties. This exception is
based upon the conjunction of three constitutional provisions:
Article II, Section 2; Article VI, Section 2; and Article I, Section
10. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution stipulates in its
relevant part: "He [The President] shall have power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
24 See Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 9 (1966); Robert
Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209,
220-21 (2002); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to
Substance, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 932-35 (2002); Scott Fruehwald, Constitutional
Constraints on State Choice of Law, 24 DAYTON L. REv. 39, 73 (1998).
25 See MCCLEAN, supra note 6.
26 See infra, Part II.
27 See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 374-76 (1983). For a critique on this
position and a call for the federalization of the conflict-of-laws field in general, see
Donald T. Trautman, Towards Federalizing Choice of Laws, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1715
(1992).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
two-thirds of the Senators present concur., 28 Article VI, Section 2
of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.29
Finally, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, in its relevant
part states that "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or
Confederation."
30
The conjunction of these provisions indicates, first, that the
conclusion of international treaties is an exclusive federal
prerogative. 31 Second, to the extent that the conflict-of-laws rules
are based upon international treaties, they precede any state law.32
The federal authorities are competent to conclude treaties
regarding all matters demanding federal attention.3 3 This applies
to state matters as well.3" Hence, it is primarily state law, in which
regulatory power is residual and embraces numerous aspects of
private law, that governs many international conflict-of-laws
issues. The power to conclude treaties regarding the very same
matters is, however, a federal power.35  A treaty-based
arrangement (of federal authorship) is considered as part of the
state law and prevails over all laws adopted in the same state
irrespective of the date of the treaty's adoption.36 In view of the
28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
29 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
30 Id. art. I, § 10.
31 See id
32 See id. art. VI, cl. 2.
33 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 644-46 (3d ed.
2000); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241-45 (6th ed.
2000).
34 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920); Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 423-33 (1998); Janet R.
Carter, Commandeering Under the Treaty Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 598 (2001).
35 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10; Id. art. 11, § 2.
36 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941); R. Beck, International
Treaties and Interstate Compacts, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 57.02 (R. Beck ed.,
1991); Barton Legum, Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1794,
18 I.C.S.I.D. 6 (2001), at http://www.worldbank.org./icsid/news/n- 18-1-6.html.
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unequivocal constitutional prohibition on states to conclude
treaties, any other approach would lead to an undesirable
prohibition on the United States against contracting international
treaties in state matters, including within the area of international
conflict-of-laws.37
The federal authorities, headed by the President, are charged
with the initiation and negotiation of international treaties. 38 The
exceptional constitutional situation described above enables
federal legislation in topics, when the basic conferral of power for
their regulation was given to the states.
Another apparent irregularity derives from the dominant role
accorded to the President - in his executive capacity - in the
initiation and formulation of international treaties.39  The
international conflict-of-laws rules are formulated as general non-
definitive rules and common law, created by the legislature and the
judiciary, respectively. Nonetheless, the President has a central
role in the conclusion of international contracts, extending beyond
his general legislative role (a fortiori exceeding his role in the
creation of common law), despite his residual authority to
intervene in the federal legislative process.4 ° The centrality of his
role regarding the conclusion of treaties is expressed by the fact
that it is the President who initiates them, the President who
conducts negotiations over their content, and the President who
signs on behalf of the United States.4 The President is thus the
final source of the United States's international obligations,
whereas the Senate's role is restricted to the ratification of those
obligations.42
On the other hand, in legislative matters the process is focused
upon the deliberations and the decisions of the legislators, and the
President's role is limited to his ability to initiate certain laws and
to his veto power.43 Under the common interpretation, treaties
37 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
38 See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 10; Id. art. 1I, § 2.
39 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936);
TRIBE, supra note 33, at 643-46.
40 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438-39 (1998); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
41 See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319; TRIBE, supra note 33, at 643-46.
42 See TRIBE, supra note 33, at 643-46.
43 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438-39; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
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may be formulated in a manner that makes them self-executing, so
that upon Senate ratification and their international validation as
tools for conducting U.S. foreign relations, they become
automatically effective without the need for special
complementary legislation." The process of Senate ratification is
less complex than the passing of an Act.45 Furthermore, presidents
may express the outcomes of their international negotiations in
forms such as "executive agreements," though the limits of this
power are not clear.46 The federal executive branch's power to
conclude treaties, especially self-executing ones (or executive
agreements which do not require Senate consent), also enables it to
exercise powers that generally belong to the (state) executive and
judiciary, including the determination of arrangements pertaining
to conflict-of-laws.47
This arrangement is characterized by an apparent non-
correlation between the conferral of constitutional powers relating
to the conclusion of international treaties and the conferral of
constitutional powers in private law matters. There are two
aspects of non-correlation. First, the power to conclude a treaty is
an entirely federal power,48 whereas the states bear the primary
responsibility for conflict-of-laws rules. Second, the power to
conclude treaties rests primarily with the executive branch, i.e. the
President,49 and this power also includes self-executing treaties,
the conclusion of which is based both upon interpretation and
44 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984);
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-
Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515 (1991);
Virginia H. Johnson, Application of the Rational Basis Test to Treaty-Implementing
Legislation: The Need for a More Stringent Standard of Review, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
347, 348-49 (2001); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM J. INT'L L. 760
(1988); Detlev F. Vagts, The Exclusive Treaty Power Revisited, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 40
(1995).
45 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that a treaty is valid upon ratification
by two-thirds of the Senators present), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (stating that for a bill
to become law it must pass both Houses of Congress and then be signed by the
President).
46 See TRIBE, supra note 33, at 648.
47 See id.
48 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10; Id. art. II, § 2.
49 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936);
TRIBE, supra note 33, at 643-46.
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current practice.5" On the other hand, conflict-of-laws rules are for
the most part determined by the legislative and judicial branches.
This means that the constitutional conferral of power to regulate
this realm of private law differs fundamentally from the conferral
of laws in other areas of private law.
It must be mentioned that both aspects of this anomalous
arrangement are relative and not absolute. Regarding the first
aspect, the legislative branches are also functional in the
conclusion of treaties,51 and the regulation of the private law is not
the exclusive domain of the states, for there is also private federal
law.52 However, there are still a number of substantive differences
between the rules governing the adoption of private laws and those
applicable to conclusion of treaties in the field of private law.
C. Illumination of the Apparent Non-Correlation by the
International Comity Consideration
In our opinion, both aspects of this apparent non-correlation
find their illumination in the international comity consideration.
This suggested illumination might also explain the possibility of
concluding self-executing treaties, the desirability if not the actual
legality of which has been disputed.
As distinct from the historical explanation, this illumination
does not necessarily rely upon the original intentions or reasoning
of the constitutional framers or the judges charged with its
interpretation, not all of which are harmonious or consistent. The
illumination of an arrangement means the presentation of a
substantive explanation, which is liable to present the best possible
justification - presenting the arrangement in its best light - while
at the same time providing an optimal solution for the apparent
difficulties extant in the current arrangement. The absence of a
necessary correlation between the historical explanations and the
illumination dictates its rather general character. But it is
sufficient if it coheres with the main elements of the arrangement,
and provides a better justification for it than other competing
explanations, historical or otherwise.
International comity means that the courts of each country
50 See Paust, supra note 44.
51 See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
52 See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 (1983).
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should exercise their judicial powers with consideration for the
goals and interests of other countries, in order to promote
cooperation, reciprocity, and international courtesy.53
Occasionally, international comity even may be at the expense of
perfect individual justice between specific litigants.5" Behavior
premised upon reciprocity will in the long term aggregately
improve the positions of all countries participating in the "game. ' 55
This principle is not external to the rules of international
conflict-of-laws, or an exception to them. It is rather one of the
principal foundations of these rules, and reflects the unique
character of international conflict-of-laws rules and their
characteristic policy considerations. In this sense, the area of
international conflict-of-laws differs from other fields of law,
which are not required to consider foreign relations with other
states.56 Even so, the consideration of comity is not an absolute
one. In essence, it is a criterion for the exercise of judicial
discretion (and in the broad sense - legislative and executive
action), but it is not conclusive. 57 The reason for this conclusion is
that any governmental branch - the court or other - may exercise
its discretion in a manner displaying total indifference, and
certainly not giving due consideration to the interests of other
countries, if so dictated by the interests of the United States, its
values, or universal values.
The apparent inconsistency of the constitutional arrangement
for concluding treaties in the field of international conflict-of-laws
- both aspects thereof - can be illuminated from the perspective of
53 See Clermont, supra note 12, at 98.
54 See Terry S. Kogan, Toward A Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of
Fairness over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 655 (1987) (discussing comity between
state courts in the United States).
55 See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 155-61 (1991); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 277, 339-44 (1990); see also Kirk A. Carter, Balancing Factors in the Spirit of
International Comity, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 545, 549-50 (1986) (discussing
the dangers that may ensue if seamen or their estates are permitted to bring personal
injury or wrongful death suits against their employers when the interests of other nations
are stronger). But see, Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 57-59 (1991).
56 See Laycock, supra note 21, at 259.
57 See generally Carter, supra note 55 (discussing the factors that must be balanced
when seamen or their estates bring personal injury or wrongful death suits against their
employers when the interests of other nations are stronger).
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international comity. As stated, the inconsistency is expressed by
the federal arrogation of state powers in certain fields of private
law, otherwise governed by state authored rules under state
jurisdiction. This arrogation is necessitated by the pan-national
nature of the consideration of international comity. Indeed, on the
international level, central importance attaches to this
consideration, based upon the wider national interests operative in
foreign policy.58
Constitutionally, the management, supervision and review of
foreign relations are federal functions par excellence.5 9 In this
context, the Constitution determines inter alia that the President is
the supreme commander of the army,6" and that after consultation
and Senate approval, the President can enter into a treaty and
appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.6'
Moreover, the Constitution also determines that the President
"shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers, 62 that
Congress shall have the Power to "provide for the common
Defense, 63 shall "define and punish Piracies and Offences against
the Law of Nations, '  regulate foreign commerce, 65 "declare
war, ' 66 and make the rules of war.6 ' Additionally, federal judicial
power given to the Supreme Court "extends to all cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and... Treaties... under
Consuls. 68 The Constitution further provides that "[i]n all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, the
58 See id.
59 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936);
Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme
or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 5-13 (1988); D. Bruce Hicks, Dueling
Decisions: Contrasting Constitutional Visions of the United States President's Foreign
Policy Role, 24 POL'Y S.J. 245, 250-55 (1996); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations
Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 496-97
(1946).
60 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
61 Id.
62 Id. art. I, § 3.
63 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
64 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
65 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
66 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
67 Id.
68 Id. art. I1I, § 2, cl. 1.
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Supreme Court has original jurisdiction."69  Concisely, the
constitution explicitly provides that "No state shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation....""
Necessarily, private law arrangements, which significantly
implicate foreign policy, should be determined and implemented
with regard for international comity as a foreign policy
consideration. Accordingly, and under the aforementioned
constitutional legislation, the federal authorities are the natural
legislators and executors of these arrangements, and none of the
individual states is permitted either to determine or implement its
own foreign policy using that avenue.7"
Admittedly, international conflict-of-laws rules not originating
in international treaties are state regulated, based upon the
legislatures and common law of the states, and implemented by
state courts. To this extent, the state courts are authorized to have
consideration for international comity. However, it would seem
that this arrangement itself, as opposed to the constitutional one
regarding treaties, is irregular and requires explanation.
Conceivably, the rules of international conflict-of-laws and
interstate conflict-of-laws are identical. Practically speaking, most
litigation occurs within interstate contexts and not international
ones. Accordingly, the rules are based on national, as opposed to
pan-national considerations. State consideration for international
comity at the legislative and judiciary levels is therefore a
secondary consideration, a derivative of its discursive focus - the
state and interstate levels.72
Despite the congressional role (the scope of which is
disputed)73 in the determination of foreign policy, and the judicial
role,74 which is limited due to the political question doctrine,75 it is
69 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
70 Id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
71 See John Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1964 (1999).
72 See id.
73 See Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. Kromos, Environmental Reform at the World
Bank: The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT'L. L. 777, 809-13 (1995).
74 See Alexander Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42
(1961).
75 See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 106 (1948);
People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23-24 (D.C. Cir.
1999); John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-
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the President as the federal executive branch who is the primary
actor in U.S. foreign policy. 76 Here, Congress's role is essentially
advisory, in addition to providing approval and inspection and
enlisting public support.77  Though the President may have
difficulty pursuing a foreign policy in defiance of congressional
opposition, foreign policy is established and led by the President
and not Congress. 78 This is the background for the illumination of
the presidential conferral, as opposed to congressional, with the
lion's share of the power to negotiate international treaties and
subsequently engage in them with the Senate consultation and
approval.79
Accordingly, we can also understand the current interpretation
and practice by which the President, with Senate approval, can
conclude a self-executing treaty, the implementation of which does
not require legislation.8" Admittedly, whether this interpretation
and practice is consistent with the Framers' original intention is
moot81 but illuminated, given the President's role as the leader of
foreign policy of the United States and its international
representative.82 Even if the Framers intended that international
treaties should not become operational absent appropriate
supplementary legislation, international comity considerations
provide an explanation for the existing situation." An
international commitment of the United States to other partner
countries in a convention clearly creates comity and such a
commitment is contingent upon the United States having entered
the convention with Senate approval, expressed by a majority of
two-thirds.84 Deferral of the treaty's implementation until, and
pending, the adoption of the complementary law, would cause
Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 747, 751-56 (1997).
76 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp, 299 U.S. 304, 319-27 (1936);
Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1254-55 (1995).
77 See Yoo, supra note 71, at 1964.
78 Id. at 1963.
79 Id.
80 See Bowles & Kromos, supra note 73, at 815.
81 See Yoo, supra note 71, at 1981-82.
82 See Bowles & Kromos, supra note 73, at 815.
83 See Yoo, supra note 71, at 1978-80.
84 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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uncertainty regarding the actual approval and whether the
conditions of approval are actually consistent with U.S. treaty
obligations.85 Such a deferral would be inimical to international
comity. 86 It must be remembered that under existing theory, the
United States is under no obligation to restrict its engagements to
self-executing treaties.87 Both the President and the Senate may
decide, in accordance with their assessment of the U.S. interests, to
conclude treaties that are not self-executing.88 However, conferring
power, where necessary to conclude a self-executing treaty,
accommodates appropriate consideration of international comity
when required and to the degree deemed appropriate by the
competent authorities.89
Furthermore, there are grounds for claiming that self-executing
treaties are necessary, having consideration for national
government's inability to enforce state compliance with treaties
and to make law applicable to individuals. 90 The international
comity of the United States may also demand that national
undertakings not be thwarted by the states. 9' To this end,
formulating a treaty to be self-executing may be beneficial and the
possibility of doing so should not be precluded.92
The option of self-executing treaties, together with their
potential contribution to the international comity of the United
States, does not significantly undermine the American system of
checks and balances. 93 The requirement of Senate approval by a
two-thirds majority together with compulsory consultation ensures
that a proper mechanism exists for parliamentary supervision. 94
85 See Yoo, supra note 71, at 1980.
86 See generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1
(1991).
87 See Yoo, supra note 71, at 1978.
88 See id. at 1959.
89 See Carlos Manuel Vsquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1104 (1992).
90 Id. at 1083.
91 See generally U.S. CONST. art. I., § 10, cl. 1, 3; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920); Paul, supra note 86, at 1 (exploring the role of states in international
comity).
92 See Damrosch, supra note 44, at 516.
93 See Yoo, supra note 71, at 1977; see also Damrosch, supra note 44, at 527.
94 See Yoo, supra note 71, at 2092.
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This is lacking in most other countries.95 For countries in which
the conclusion of an international treaty is the executive
prerogative, a treaty can only be implemented by a law, which
expresses the approval and the support of the legislative branch.96
The constitutional arrangement in the United States guarantees
such approval and support, with a special majority, at the early
stage of the actual engagement in the treaty.97 Thus, as a matter of
principle, nothing need prevent the Senate from considering the
waiver of additional congressional involvement by way of
supplementary legislation.98
It would, therefore, seem that the international comity
consideration, which as stated is one of the basic rules of
international conflict-of-laws, is particularly enlightening
regarding the apparent discord between conferral of constitutional
power for the conclusion of conflict-of-laws conventions and
conferral of constitutional powers for the determination of other
private law arrangements.
II. Substantive Non-Correlations: Suggested Normative
Adjustments
A. International Comity and Conflict-of-Laws Treaties
The international comity of the United States under the
conflict-of-laws treaties can clash, at least as far as an American
citizen is involved,99 with other substantive constitutional rules
(e.g. in the realm of human rights and civil liberties).' ° The
problem is relevant primarily in the context of conflict-of-laws.
Accordingly, when applying regular international conflict-of-laws
rules, an American court may find itself adjudicating a dispute
under a foreign law which conflicts with the American
95 See generally Paul, supra note 86, at 1 (comparing international comity in the
United States and other nations).
96 Id.
97 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
98 Id.
99 See Clermont, supra note 12, at 126.
100 See Sarah Hudleston, Note, Preserving Free Speech in Global Courtroom: The
Proposed Hague Convention and the First Amendment, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 403,
404 (2001).
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Constitution.' Alternatively, under the same rules, an American
court may be forced to recognize foreign judgments as resjudicata
or enforce foreign judgments, the contents of which conflict with
substantive arrangements determined in the Constitution. 10 2 Like
the problem discussed in the previous section, this problem too has
become increasingly relevant in the age of globalization, in which
there are ever more multi-jurisdictional claims."0 3 It reflects an
inherent tension between the procedural sovereignty of the United
States and its substantive sovereignty."° In other words, while
U.S. constitutional power to conclude international treaties
broadens the range of procedures for expressing its sovereignty,
the actual exercise of that sovereignty may abridge its freedom to
realize, in appropriate cases, other substantive constitutional
values.'05
Obviously, international comity supports the application of
foreign laws, which the United States has undertaken to apply
pursuant to its treaty commitments. °6 In our opinion, its power in
this context increases by comparison with its power in regular
cases, which do not involve a legal commitment, whether pursuant
to a treaty or another legally binding source of international law.0 7
In such regular cases, the comity inducing the courts to apply a
foreign law or enforce a foreign judgment reflects a foreign policy
interest in the promotion of proper relations with other countries,
premised upon appropriate reciprocal consideration of accepted
moral norms.' But comity in this sense is an exclusively political
consideration.'0 9  It does not entitle the other country to
consideration of its interest, neither under international law nor
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 418.
104 See id. at 432.
105 See id.
106 See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1601, 1603
(1968).
107 See Hudleston, supra note 100, at 422.
108 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 106, at 1603-04.
109 See Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Exp., 314 U.S. 201, 209 (1941) (asserting that
recognition of foreign law under the doctrine of comity is not a matter of right, and that
such recognition of the foreign law is purely voluntary on part of the nation in whose
courts the question may arise).
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under any other source. On the other hand, application of the
foreign law originating in a treaty to which the United States and
the other country are parties creates international comity.
International comity"' exceeds the boundaries of political interest;
it is based upon legal commitment of a contractual nature."' The
most jarring infringement of international comity originates in the
breach of a legal commitment; the gravity of such a breach
exceeds the gravity of a comity breach occasioned by failure to
consider the interests of a foreign country not legally entitled to
such consideration."
1 2
B. Constitutional versus International Obligations
Despite our comments above, the rejection of the
constitutionality requirement in certain cases is impossible and
undesirable.' The Constitution is not a state law subject to
federal treaties. "' A court adjudicating a claim functions as a
governmental branch of the United States (or one of the states)
and, as such, is bound by the Constitution." 5 It is not permitted to
make decisions or issue orders that breach constitutional
provisions directed at branches of the U.S. government or at one of
the states." 6 In Shelley v. Kraemer, Chief Justice Vinson wrote in
this context regarding the Fourteenth Amendment:
Ilo See id.
I 1 See Clermont, supra note 12, at 189.
112 Together with the consideration of international comity, the consideration of
legal coherency and non-application of contrived laws also supports the respecting of the
treaty. The reason is that the inherent result of applying a substantive foreign law
combined with the constitution of the forum country is the application of an artificial
law, which is not the real law that applies to the country dictated by the international
conflict-of-laws rules. This is obvious in those cases in which the application of the local
constitution leads to a final conclusion different than that which would have been
dictated by application of the law referred to by the international conflict-of-laws rules.
The application of the local constitution in these cases amounts to a breach of the
international conflict-of-laws rules and means the application of artificial rules, which
are not the laws of any country, thus impairing legal coherency. The consideration of
legal coherency, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
113 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
114 See id. at 434.
115 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (holding that while a private
discriminatory covenant did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, a state court's
enforcement of the discriminatory covenant would).
116 Seeid.
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[That] [t]he action of state courts and judicial officers in their
official capacities is to be regarded as action of the state within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition
which has long been established ... state action in violation of
the Amendment's provisions is equally repugnant to the
constitutional commands whether directed by state statute or
taken by a judicial official in the absence of statute.117
Concededly, Shelley v. Kraemer has been distinguished and
limited over the years, to prevent the penetration of constitutional
provisions into unintended areas." 8 But, in exercising its powers,
the judiciary is still subject to constitutional limitations that are not
necessarily grounded in the substantive law that it applies." 9 For
our purpose, this means that the Constitution may prevent judicial
"cooperation" in a governmental capacity with the foreign laws
applicable under the rules of international conflict-of-laws or with
foreign judgments that are candidates for recognition or
enforcement. 120 In our opinion, this rule applies with even greater
force when a claim is based upon an international treaty binding
the United States. A treaty to which the United States is a party is
not a regular contract, the parties to which are private persons.
The actual engagement of an American governmental authority in
a convention that substantively contradicts the American
Constitution is unconstitutional, above and beyond the
unconstitutionality of its enforcement by an American court.121
Furthermore, even when the Constitution does not impose
direct duties upon the courts, it expresses the fundamental
political, social, and moral principles of the United States.
122
117 Id. at 13.
118 See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970) (upholding a Georgia city's
reversion of a public park back to the heirs of the testator, rather than comply with an
integration order where the racially discriminatory covenant originated in a private party,
the testator, not in the state or its agents).
119 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1978); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834);
Patrick J. Borchers, Could a Treaty Stump Supreme Court Doctrine? Judgments,
Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1161, 1164-71 (1998); William
Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 387-88
(2000).
120 But see Borchers, supra note 119, at 1173.
121 But see Hudleston, supra note 100, at 425.
122 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1991); United States v.
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 689-91 (1998).
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Some of these principles embody what American society considers
to be absolute moral principles, universally valid and justified 123
(as opposed to absolute universal application in positive law,
which presumably is rare). In order to identify such universal
constitutional principles, one can inter alia examine whether the
principle under discussion is grounded in public international law.
Application of foreign laws or the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in conflict with the Constitution may be
regarded by the United States as a violation of both its own
fundamental principles and of basic universal principles.14 Judicial
application of these principles expresses the United States's
sovereignty over foreign laws, and their waiver could be regarded
as unreasonable.1
25
Admittedly, application of foreign laws and the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments expresses a country's
readiness to partially cede its sovereignty, inter alia, for reasons of
international courtesy. 126 But in our opinion, though international
courtesy may warrant judicial restraint based on consideration for
the United States's treaty commitments, it does not obligate the
courts to waive basic constitutional principles. 127 This is especially
true when sub-constitutional foreign laws confront the
Constitution of the United States. 1 8  It is inconceivable that the
Constitution, which precedes and annuls sub-constitutional state
laws, should be stripped of that power when confronted by
unconstitutional foreign laws. 1
29
For similar reasons, traditional international conflict-of-laws
123 See Paolo Torzilli, Reconciling the Sanctity of Human Life, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Constitution, 40 CATH. LAW. 197, 202-03 (2000).
124 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) ("[Tihe shield which the Bill of
Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.").
125 But see Sharon E. Foster, Does the First Amendment Restrict Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Copyright Judgments and Arbitration Awards?, 10 PACE INTL'L
L. REv. 361, 389-90 (1998).
126 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 106, at 1603-04.
127 See Hudleston, supra note 100, at 422 ("A treaty is still subordinate to the
Constitution, and its rules must conform to this inferior position, but Supreme Court case
law establishes that when an international interest is at stake, claims of
unconstitutionality will not be easily recognized.").
128 See id.
129 See id. at 432.
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rules make application of foreign laws and the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments subject to the external public
policy of the United States 3 ' and its mandatory rules (and
occasionally even the mandatory rules of a third, foreign
country).' 3' These two classic doctrines - the external public
policy doctrine and the doctrine of mandatory rules - prevent
application of foreign laws and the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments when the foreign laws or judgments conflict
with principles of the United States (or a third country).' They
reflect basic values and interests that American society is
unwilling to relinquish when confronted by conflicting values or
interests expressed in foreign laws or judgments.133 This is
certainly the case with respect to interests of public policy and
non-constitutional, mandatory rules and it applies afortiori in the
context of the constitutional principles of the forum country.
134
These doctrines also apply when the self-executing treaty or the
law dictates the application of a foreign law.'35
C. Applying the Constitution When a Conflict-of-Laws Treaty
Refers to a Foreign Law
The application of the United States Constitution in cases
where the conflict-of-laws rules refer to a foreign law or in cases
where a court is requested to recognize or enforce a foreign
judgment, does not mean that the Constitution will be applied in
the same manner in which it would have been applied if the
applicable law was the state law in its entirety.
36
130 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (holding that
while a foreign statute is not law in New York, it rises to an obligation that this court will
enforce unless some sound reason of public policy makes it unwise); SCOLES ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 50, 663, 979-82.
131 See ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 44 (4th ed. 1986)
[hereinafter LEFLAR, ET AL]. For the applicability of mandatory laws of a third country,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
132 LEFLAR, ETAL.,supra note 131, § 44.
133 See id.
134 Id.
135 See Russel J. Weintrub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-
Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 167, 193-95 (1998).
136 See Derek Devgun, United States Enforcement of English Defamation
Judgments: Exploring the First Amendment, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 195, 210-12 (1994).
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Consequently, where constitutional provisions are applicable
to courts in their governmental capacity, their applicability must
further be examined with respect to cases in which a treaty refers
to a foreign law or in proceedings of recognition or enforcement of
foreign judgments. The reason is that some of the constitutional
provisions imposing duties upon the judiciary are of a local
character, in that they bind the judiciary in its application of the
local law and not a foreign law. For example, in Estate of
Thornton v. Caldo, Inc.,'37 the Supreme Court invalidated under
the First Amendment a Connecticut statute that required private
employers to honor every employee's desire to refuse to work on
"his Sabbath." Presumably, this ruling would not dictate the
avoidance of laws of foreign countries or refusal to enforce or
recognize judgments of such countries, by reason of the First
Amendment proscription of establishment of religion.'38 The
distinction lies in the non-universal character of the proscription,
geared toward the particular character and special needs of
American society.'39
As a result, it would seem that an employment agreement
adjudicated under a foreign law mandating respect for the
employee's day of rest, and for which the place of performance
was the foreign country, would be adjudicated under that foreign
law in its entirety. An American court would not invalidate the
foreign law, nor would it refrain from enforcing a foreign
judgment for severance pay given under that law (despite the
recognition given by an American court: thereby to an
unconstitutional law). 4 ' The constitutional prohibition of
establishment of religion only applies to "its establishment" in the
United States, and does not prevent an American court from
recognizing, in appropriate cases, the establishment of religion by
another country within its own borders.14'
Furthermore, the entrenchment of a rule in the Constitution
indicates its substantive status, as expressing basic principles of
137 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
138 Devgun, supra note 136, at 202-04 (arguing that provisions of the First
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the United States that in many cases are binding upon all branches
of its government including the courts, and that are often perceived
by American society as expressing universal values, which should
also be applied in disputes substantively governed by foreign law.
The international conflict-of-laws rules are ultimately based upon
a default option by which the Court applies the specific national
law dictated by the international conflict-of-laws, which is not
necessarily the relevant American law, whether federal or state.
The conception of the Constitution as a "regular" American law is
liable to annul its special status as the supreme legal norm,
expressing the fundamental principles of the system, which is a
status that may justify deviation from the default option.
D. Which Law Should Be Applied Instead ofan
Unconstitutional Foreign Law
Invalidation of a foreign law, otherwise applicable under a
treaty due to its contradiction of the applicable provision in the
United States Constitution, raises the question of which law should
replace the invalidated law. The invalidation of the foreign law
does not release the court from its obligation to rule on the dispute
before it.'42 In fact, it is the United States's (or another state's)
striving to realize its universal Constitutional provisions that
conduces the Court to adjudicate the dispute itself. Where an
American law (or law of another state) dictates the invalidation of
a foreign law otherwise applicable by reason of international
conflict-of-laws rules, there are two default options: the foreign
law can be applied as if the invalid provision was not included
therein,' or the invalidated provision can be replaced with a
parallel provision stipulated in the forum law.'44
142 It would seem that the parallel question does not arise regarding procedures of
recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments. A foreign judgment that contravenes a
provision of the local constitution will neither be enforced nor recognized by the land of
the constitution, which will reject the claim. In such a case, there is obviously no
question regarding which judgment will be recognized or enforced instead of the
judgment, which was invalidated.
143 See, e.g., Pearson v. N.E. Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding
that a New York Court may find a defendant liable based on Massachusetts's wrongful
death statute and refusing to impose Massachusetts's limitation on damages when New
York does not have such a limitation).
144 Yet, it seems that in courts which apply modem approaches to conflict-of-laws
that are based on policy considerations, there is no prospect that foreign law contradicts
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In our opinion, both of these options are problematic. The first
option entails the application of artificial laws, not based upon any
of the rationales behind international conflict-of-laws rules and not
promoting any coherent policy.'45 The second leads to a broad
breach of the American duty under the treaty and serious damage
to its international comity.'46
Against this background, it seems that where a foreign law is
voidable due to its conflict with the Constitution, there should be
an initial examination of whether the avoidable provision can be
separated substantively from the other provisions of the applicable
law. For example, the case of an employer's claim against an
employee based on two separate grounds: first - contractual (due
to breach of employment contract), and second - tortuous or
property (due to the violation of trade secret) by reason of the
employee having worked for one of the plaintiffs competitors.'47
In the United States, the tortuous head can be avoided, for it
violates the freedom of occupation.'48 The contractual head, on the
other hand, complies with American constitutionalism, since,
under American law, in order for a contractual clause restricting
employment to be upheld, it is sufficient that it be reasonable
49
and in the absence of a contractual condition, an inevitable
misappropriation of trade secrets must exist. 5 ' The reasonableness
requirement is more lenient, substantively and evidentially, than
the requirement of inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets."'
A clear distinction can be made between the tortuous-property
ground and the contract ground, allowing judgment to be given on
the basis of contract. Consequently, the invalidation of the first
grounds does not diminish the coherency of the foreign law to be
the public policy of the Forum. See LEFLAR, ET AL., supra note 131, § 93.
145 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
146 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1895).
147 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
148 See AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
149 See id. at 1206 ("An employer is always free to protect its interests through a
reasonable restrictive covenant not to compete.").
150 See PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1268-70. For a discussion of the Inevitable
Misappropriation Doctrine, see Jay L. Koh, From Hoops to Hard Drives: An Accession
Law Approach to the Inevitable Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U. L. REV.
271, 276-80 (1998).
151 See AMP, Inc., 823 F.2d at 1206-07; Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp.
624, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
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applied, and does not lead to application of artificial foreign law
that the parties could never have expected, and which does not
promote any rational policy.
152
However, in other cases, this examination may demonstrate
that it is totally unreasonable to separate the avoidable,
unconstitutional legal provisions from the other legal,
constitutional provisions; for example, a defamation action
involving foreign law provisions that determine the scope of
substantive liability by imposing restrictions upon freedom of
expression. Under the First Amendment, such provisions may be
invalidated. Nonetheless, invalidation of the offensive provisions,
while retaining intact all the defenses provided by the foreign law
could lead to warped results, thereby making the separation
unreasonable. As a rule, the scope of substantive liability for
defamation is connected to the scope of the defenses. Limitation
of substantive liability is likely to be accompanied by a parallel
limitation of defenses, for broad defenses are not required when
substantive liability is limited. On the other hand, broad
substantive liability may necessitate broad defenses as a
proportionate balance to the broadened substantive liability for
defamation. For our purposes, this means that replacing the broad
liability specified in the foreign law with the narrower liability
under the forum law, while retaining the limited defense of the
foreign law, leads to a warped, unbalanced result. The result would
be that the overall scope of liability (after applying the defenses)
for defamation is narrower not only than that of the applicable law,
but also than that of the forum. This result is unreasonable and
does not reflect any coherent policy.
It seems, therefore, that when a particular provision of the
applicable law is unconstitutional, an analogy should be drawn
from the severance (divisibility) rule.'53 Accordingly, statutory
provisions found to be illegal will lead to the avoidance of the
entire law as unconstitutional if the invalidation of the particular
provision will undermine the underlying legislative purpose."4 On
152 See LEFLAR ETAL., supra note 131, § 93.
153 Mark R. Kravitz & Daniel J. Klau, Developments in the Second Circuit: 2000-
2001, 34 CoNN. L. REV. 833, 909-10 (2002); see Steven Walt, Decision by Division:
The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 RUTGERs L. REv. 369, 383
n.47 (1999).
154 See Ala. Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) ("The... relevant
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the other hand, if the constitutionally valid statutory provisions are
retainable after avoidance of the unconstitutional provision,
without undermining the legislative policy, only the
unconstitutional provision will be invalidated. 55 In this context,
consideration may also be given to the severance provisions
occasionally determined by the law itself. However, the absence
of such provisions does not preclude separation in terms of the
purpose of the law under discussion.'56 Conceivably, in these
contexts it is appropriate to apply the special care rule. This rule is
generally applied to the invalidation of American laws (federal and
to a large extent state), and not to foreign laws made applicable
pursuant to a treaty.157 Its application would give expression to the
status of a treaty as constituting a legal obligation and the highest
level of international comity.
E. Constitutionality Versus Public Policy
The doctrine of external public policy prohibits the application
of a foreign law (or judgment), which is inconsistent with the basic
principles of the United States or relevant state. 158 It is enforceable
with respect to foreign laws, which would otherwise apply under
the conflict-of-laws rules in the narrow sense, or by virtue of the
recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments.'59 It grants the
court relatively broad discretion, for these "basic principles" lack
precise definition. 6 ° They exist rather in the form of "examples,"
according to the classic common law style, as cases in which laws
or foreign judgments retreat before the principles of the United
inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a manner
consistent with the intent of Congress.").
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., id at 697 (finding the legislative-veto provision of the Airline
Deregulation Act unconstitutional and severable from the remainder of the Act); Ala.
Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 680; Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 959 (1983).
157 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959; Alaska Airlines Inc., 480 U.S. at 680.
158 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164-56 (1895); JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC § 38, at 35 (8th ed.
1883); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 50.
159 See STORY, supra note 158, § 38 at 35.
160 See Holly Sprague, Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell to Comity and Public
Policy, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (1986).
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States and cases in which there is no such retreat.1 6 1
External public policy as applied in the field of international
conflict-of-laws, is not identical to internal public policy as applied
in domestic private law. For instance, contracts law is generally of
a narrower scope than that covered by internal public policy.
162
The variation in their scope stems from their diverse respective
goals. When applied internally, public policy imposes restrictions
on private legal norms, mainly contractual provisions, whereas,
when applied externally it imposes restrictions upon government
norms, mainly in the form of laws and judgments. But, as opposed
to internal governmental norms, foreign governmental norms are
subject to the judicial review of the forum on the grounds of public
policy. Even so, considerations of international comity and
international tolerance dictate special restraint in the exercise of
judicial review of the legal norms of foreign countries. 163
Furthermore, the actual existence of a foreign element dilutes
its effect on the interests of the United States or the state and
weakens the interest in intervening with the results dictated by the
substantive law that is supposed to apply.164 These considerations
do not exist to the same extent in the context of private legal
norms, regardless of whether the applicable law is American or
foreign (in which case the public policy muster is double, in
accordance with the internal public policy of the country whose
law applies and the external public policy accepted in the United
States or other country). 65
For purposes of this essay, the question arises regarding the
161 Id.
162 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198 (1918). The terms
"external public policy" and "internal public policy" are accepted in the English
Common Law. See Michael L. Novicoff, Blocking and Clawing Back in the Name of
Public Policy: The United Kingdom's Protection of Private Economic Interest Against
Adverse Foreign Adjudication, 7 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 12, 23-24 (1985). Even so,
American Law also adopted the parallel distinction between two scopes of public policy,
and in the American literature it is relevant and even customary to refer to English case
law and literature. See Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment
at Will - When Should Courts Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REv. 956, n.37
(1993); John E. Gardner, Federal Labor Law Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge
Claims, 58 U. CrN. L. REv. 491, 550-51 (1989).
163 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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relationship between the external public policy of the United
States and the Constitution. As stated, both sources serve in the
review of foreign norms, whether laws or judgments. Indeed,
there are cases in which both categories of review will produce
identical results. For example, discrimination contravenes the U.S.
Constitution and it may be reasonably presumed that at least in
certain cases, given its universality, it would lead to the
invalidation of foreign laws or judgments (and not only of
American judgments).'66 In the same way, a discriminatory
foreign law or judgment could be declared as contradicting
external public policy and consequently be avoided.167  The
question, therefore, is whether there are two separate categories or
whether they are coterminous (and, if the latter, what is the
specific context for the application of each one of them). For
example, there were two cases in which American courts (a
Federal court and a State court) refused to enforce British
judgments that contravened the First Amendment, because their
enforcement would contravene public policy, to the extent that it
breached a mandatory provision.
68
Indeed, there is a facial similarity between the application of
constitutional provisions, which are liable to lead to the avoidance
or non-enforcement of foreign legal norms, and external public
policy considerations whose application would also lead to similar
results. But in our opinion they are nonetheless two separate
categories and the distinction between them ought to be
maintained.
We will begin with the connection between the two categories.
The connection between the application of constitutional
provisions, which may lead to avoidance or refusal to enforce
foreign legal norms and external public policy, is based upon the
fact that not all constitutional provisions are automatically
166 See Michael L. Novicoff, Blocking and Clawing Back in the Name of Public
Policy: The United Kingdom 's Protection of Private Economic Interest Against Adverse
Foreign Adjudication, 7 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 12, 23-24 (1985).
167 Id.
168 See Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 888 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995); Buchanan v. India
Abroad Publ., Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Supp. Ct. 1992). For discussion of these cases,
see Hudleston, supra note 100, at 411-15; Foster, supra note 125, at 389-90; Devgun,
supra note 136, at 202-06 (discussing the Buchanan case).
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applicable, directly or indirectly, to foreign legal norms. 6 9 Their
application is discretional, and the Constitutional provisions
applied to foreign legal norms are the same provisions that restrict
the power of an American Court, or provisions reflecting universal
values applicable in all places, including outside the United
States. 70 External public policy, as distinct from internal public
policy, also reflects values, which the United States or state regard
as universally valid, and which from their perspective are also
applicable in cases not subject to their legal system.17'
In view of the above, it could be claimed that the
Constitutional provisions applied in foreign contexts are no more
than specific examples of external public policy. But in our view,
this claim is fundamentally untrue, and specifically, it is inaccurate
in the context of the conflict-of-laws rules determined in a treaty.
This position derives from a few considerations.
Firstly, the Constitution is the supreme law of the United
States, established by its founders, and can only be changed
through a particularly complex process. External public policy is
generally part of the common law. As such, not only does it lack
any extra-legal status, but it can also be deviated from, or amended
by law. By extension, it cannot be said that constitutional
provisions are part of the common law, which may be sub-
constitutional or even sub-legal. Constitutional provisions and
other laws also may influence the contents of the external public
policy or even change it, but they are not an integral part of the
rules of the common law, subsumed under the title of "external
public policy."'72
Secondly, the Constitution is a written, formal, rigid document,
not easily given to amendment.'73 External public policy, as part
of the common law, is characterized by its flexibility; it is
characteristically not grounded in any formal document with
defined content. 7 4 Practically speaking, its content is a matter of
169 See sources cited supra note 162.
170 See sources cited supra note 162.
171 See sources cited supra note 162.
172 See Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will -
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judicial discretion.' Granted, according to at least some
interpretative views, the Court also has reasonably broad latitude
in its constitutional interpretation.'76 Its discretion is applied in
both the interpretation it gives to substantive constitutional
provisions and in its interpretation regarding their applicability to
foreign legal norms (including their application to the Court itself,
in a manner that allows it to avoid enforcing norms that contravene
the Constitution). 77 Even so, the interpretation of the Constitution
by the courts is ultimately subject to the constitutional text, which
is not absolutely fluid.'78 The Court is not authorized to "interpret"
the constitution in a manner that is inconsistent with its wording.'79
Thus, external public policy is considerably more malleable and
subject to development than are the constitutional provisions that
apply to foreign laws or judgments. 80
Thirdly, it is precisely the constitutional entrenchment of
certain requirements that can engender their application to foreign
legal norms, whereas it is doubtful whether the same requirements
would have been determined as part of the external public
policy.'8' For example, the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life
liberty or property" occasions various procedural rights, and is
similarly likely to apply in the context of international conflict-of-
laws. 8 2 However, it is doubtful if these rights in their entirety
would have been classified as belonging to external public policy
of the United States, if not for their prior classification as
175 Id.
176 See, e.g., Miller Superintendent, Pendleton Corr. Facility v. French, 530 U.S.
327, 355-56 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
177 See, e.g., Miller, 530 U.S. at 355-56; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235.
178 See sources cited supra note 177.
179 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1991); Judith S. Kaye,
State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statues, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1995).
180 See generally Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 38-39; Kaye, supra note 179,
at 26-27.
181 See McGown v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Mathews, Sec'y of
Health, Educ., and Welfare v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Morrisey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
182 See Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 481; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333; McGown, 366 U.S. at
425-26.
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Constitutional rights.183
Fourthly, in certain contexts, there are grounds for claiming
that it is precisely the Constitution that protects the public policy
exception when realizing the principles of federalism and
protection of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.'84
Even so, it does not follow that the contents of public policy are
fixed in the Constitution, but rather that a state's right to avoid
recognition of foreign laws that contradict public policy is a
constitutional right constituting the basis of American
federalism.'85
These four proposed distinctions between constitutional
provisions and external public policy are relevant both for cases in
which the international conflict-of-laws rules are treaty-based, or
when they are based on common law. There is, however, a fifth
distinction, which applies only to conflict-of-laws rules established
in a self-executing treaty or in a federal law executing the same.'86
There are two aspects to this distinction. The first is that the
contravention of external state policy (similar to a contravention of
any other internal state law) does not empower a state court to
invalidate a provision of a treaty legally concluded by the United
States."8 7 Under the Constitution, a treaty is part of "the Supreme
Law of the Land"'88 and, as such, is normatively subordinate to the
Constitution.'89 It is certainly not subject to conceptions of "public
policy" external to the Constitution.19 This is not the case when
the avoidance is based upon the U.S. Constitution. 9'
The second, more general aspect is that a court implementing
183 See Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 481; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333; McGown, 366 U.S. at
425-26.
184 See L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same Sex
"Marriage": How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exceptions, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 29, 37 (1998).
185 See id.
186 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
187 This was fixed in the Supreme Court ruling of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at
434.
188 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
189 See supra notes 27, 33-34 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 27, 33-34 and accompanying text.
191 See Reid, Superintendent, D.C. Jail v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957); De
Geofroy v. Rigs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
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conflict-of-laws rules (in the narrow sense) or rules for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments determined in a treaty,
should use its discretion to avoid foreign laws. This should be
done on the basis of public policy with a higher degree of restraint,
dictated by the particularly high level of international comity
created by the treaty.'92 Furthermore, the Court may consider only
factors affecting universal public policy, or at least federal public
policy, but not public policy grounded in state considerations.
These restrictions clearly would not apply to the constitutionally
based avoidance, which is the supreme law of the land, also
binding upon treaties.'93
F. Recognition or Enforcement of Foreign Judgments under
a Treaty
A special problem may arise when a court is asked to
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment by virtue of a multilateral
or bilateral treaty (and not exclusively by virtue of international
comity, which is not based upon a binding treaty).'94 To date, the
United States has not joined treaties of this kind, but may do so in
the future,'95 and the problem is whether the enforcement or
recognition of a foreign judgment can be opposed on the basis of
its contravening the U.S. Constitution.'96
A similar problem has been dealt with on an internal level,
which is regulated by the collateral bar rule and its exceptions.'97
The collateral bar rule prevents a person who has breached a
judicial injunction or administrative order from challenging the
192 See supra notes 27, 33-34 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 27, 33-34 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 27, 33-34 and accompanying text.
195 In 1977, the United States initiated a Treaty for Mutual Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments with England, however, the treaty was never ratified due to
English reservations. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1152.
196 See generally id. at 1152.
197 See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 293-94
(1947). For a discussion of the collateral bar rule see, inter alia, Richard E. Labunski,
The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Enforcing
Unconstitutional Orders, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 323 (1988); Ariel L. Bendor, Prior
Restraint, Incommensurability and the Constitutionalism of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
289, 352-56 (1999); Hal Scott Shapiro, Note, The Collateral Bar Rule - Transparently
Invalid: A Theoretical and Historical Perspective, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. &. PROBS. 561
(1991).
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constitutionality of the breached order during proceedings,
including civil contempt proceedings, instituted against him
because of the breach.198 The very breach of such an injunction or
order is prohibited, regardless of the fact that the order in question
may have been unconstitutional.199 The only defenses that the
person in breach may raise are that: (1) the court or administrative
authority that made the decision lacked the substantive or formal
competence; or (2) the law under which the court granted the
restraint was facially unconstitutional."'
The collateral bar rule does not apply to procedures of
recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments.2 1 In other
words, a litigant who lost a case conducted abroad, including in a
trial which was governed by American law under the conflict-of-
laws rules of the country in which it was given, and thereafter
failed to execute the judgment, is not estopped from claiming in
the framework of enforcement or recognition of a foreign
judgment, that the order was unconstitutional.2 2 In our opinion,
however, even if the collateral bar rule does not apply to such
proceedings, and it certainly is not of automatic applicability,
considerations of justice between the parties, especially the
consideration of international comity, may in certain cases justify
the restraint of an American court in exercising "judicial review of
the foreign judgment" by way of analogy; provided, however, that
the party in breach had been given a full right of claim abroad or
appropriate right of claim, and the substantive law applied is the
American law or the law of another country, which in terms of its
contents is similar to the relevant American constitutional law.2 °3
III. Conclusion
The rules of international conflict-of-laws are basically part of
private law because they deal with the establishment of rights and
198 See sources cited supra note 197.
199 See sources cited supra note 197.
200 See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) (suggesting that an
injunction that was "transparently invalid" or that had been issued by a court lacking
jurisdiction would not be covered by the collateral bar rule).
201 See sources cited supra note 197.
202 See sources cited supra note 197.
203 See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1152.
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debts between individuals.2 4 Even so, the international and multi-
national aspects of dispute resolution, in cases affecting a large
number of states, give rise to the consideration of international
comity as an integral, though not dominant, consideration in this
field.20 ' The rules of international conflict-of-laws in treaties
change, and, in fact, substantively upgrade the status of the
consideration. Such changes express not only international
courtesy, but also a legal international commitment of a
contractual nature, which is anchored in the United States as the
"Supreme Law of the Land.,
20 6
As detailed at the beginning of this article, this substantive
difference provides a rationale for the apparent non-correlation
between the constitutional arrangements in the institutional realm
for regulating private law in general and such arrangements as they
affect the regulation by way of international conflict-of-laws
treaties.2 7  This difference also requires conferring special
significance on international comity in dealing with cases in which
there is an apparent non-correlation between the international
constitutional commitment of the United States under conflict-of-
laws treaties and its commitment to the supremacy of the
Constitution. 8
204 See Beth Ann Isenberg, The Evolving Conflict Between Employment
Discrimination Laws and Immunity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Article
VIII of the FCN Treaty Between the United States and Japan - The Papaila Case, 60
ALB. L. REv. 1441, 1455-56 (1997); Ray Y. Chan, Note, The Enforceability of Annulled
Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States: A Critique of Chromalloy, 17 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 141, 177, n.189 (1999).
205 See sources cited supra note 197.
206 See sources cited supra note 197.
207 See generally sources cited supra note 162.
208 See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1152.
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